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by
Simon SC Tay
In
2001, three leaders of South East Asian countries were investigated
for corruption. The allegations against President Estrada of the
Philippines, President Wahid of Indonesia, and Prime Minister
Thaksin of Thailand, were in no way connected. These trials, unprecedented
in many ways, were however markers of change.
A
norm has shifted in Asia. In the past, the idea of even investigating
leaders would have been unthinkable. Today, the ideal of a good
and non-corrupt government is part of what Asians value. But while
efforts have been made, corruption still remains an everyday occurrence.
Among the ASEAN states, Indonesia and Vietnam were amid the countries
rated lowest by Transparency International. Thailand, the Philippines
and Malaysia were only slightly better. From Asia, Singapore alone
was rated in the top tier, alongside countries like Denmark.
During the years of the so-called Asian miracle, this did not
seem to matter so much. Some even argued that corruption paid
by businessmen to officials was little more than an extra tax
or license fee. Development, they said, was not affected, so long
as the bribe achieved its purpose, was not exorbitant and there
were profits to be made. The crisis of 1997 changed that.
Corruption, cronyism and nepotism KKN in Indonesian parlance
were identified among the root causes of the crisis. KKN
had led to many projects that were not rational and viable. Rent-seeking
behaviour and corruption had spawned hubris and mega-projects
that did not recognize the discipline of the bottom line. Currency
fluctuations were only the trigger points. Thus, recovery requires
a reform in governance in Asia both public and in the private
sector.
That call for reform has been followed, in part, by action. Hence
the very public investigations of the three regional leaders.
If the most powerful can be brought down to account for charges
of corruption, the reformers argued, this would send the right
signals throughout the system and other officials could be brought
into line.
Two of the three leaders Wahid and Estrada -- have gone
from office. Prime Minister Thaksin of Thailand remains in power
after a controversial decision by the Supreme Constitutional Court
to acquit him. It is an open question however if the adage two
out of three is not bad should apply.
The change in attitude against corruption is not absolute. In
the Philippines and Indonesia, the leaders were pushed out more
for mismanagement than corruption per se. The allegations in Bulogate
against Wahid and by Singson against Estrada only gave stronger
grounds to those critics and political opponents who were already
looking for reasons. If the leaders had been effective or promised
to be, perhaps what they had done and much more could have been
forgiven.
This may well describe the underlying difference between their
fate and Prime Minister Thaksins. Backed by a large majority
that had elected him and still believed he could put the country
on the right path, the Thai leader gave scant respect to his corruption
trial. He has even criticised the idea that he could be disqualified
from office by non-elected judges.
Political power, in this regard, still matters. The moral imperative
of weeding out corruption bends to the prospect of an effective
government.
Given the pain of these last years of crisis and drift, this may
be understandable. There is a danger that anti-corruption efforts
and reform in Asia may falter as the crisis years grow more distant.
What can be done?
Corruption
must be seen not only as a moral issue, but an economic one. The
World Bank and Transparency International have already drawn the
links from good governance and anti-corruption efforts, to competitiveness.
In theory, countries that are cleaner should be better at attracting
and sustaining foreign direct investment (FDI). Clearly, corruption
increases the risk of doing business. In contrast, systems that
are more predictable, fair and open should be more
attractive to investors who think long term.
The difficulties in translating that theory into practice are
however manifold.
Perhaps the major difficulty is that there is no quick fix to
corruption. Even if a political leader tries to reform, it is
not something that he or she can do alone. A national integrity
system is needed that involves not just laws and police, but courts,
political leaders, a freer media and an aware and able civil society.
The case of Singapore, as an exception in Asia, is often traced
to the Peoples Action Party (PAP) government and the example of
Lee Kuan Yew, as the founding prime minister. Yet, while leaders
and political will are essential, there are other necessary ingredients
for the wider civil service. This includes a system of meritocracy
in allocating recognition and reward and sufficient pay.
Setting up such a system is not easy. Corruption cannot be contained
and in many societies has already eaten away at institutions,
like the courts, that could potentially lead the anti-corruption
campaign. For many, corruption is widespread and the public finances
are already much reduced. With a large government deficit, pay
rises for officials to lessen temptation may be
economically and politically impossible. The prescription of a
national integrity system may be readily accepted in principle
but much harder to implement. Even nations that want to reform
may be unable to do so.
The international community has done very little to encourage
the process. The question of corruption has largely been avoided
by the UN and other intergovernmental institutions, as being political
dynamite. This is notwithstanding the clear links to good governance,
development and democracy.
Businesses too, while bemoaning risky and corrupt regimes, have
done little. Instead, FDI pours into countries like China, where
corruption remains a major issue. The hope of large rewards, it
would seem, overwhelms considerations about corruption.
Yet, there are helpful things that the international community
and multinational businesses can do about corruption, even if
they do not wish to interfere in domestic, moral questions.
Proposals for combating corruption
One possibility is for more states to join those like the USA
and Singapore that already make it a crime for their citizens
to engage in corrupt practices abroad. Another is to measure the
risk that comes in corrupt systems more accurately and enter that
into the business equation of promoting foreign investment. A
third initiative can be undertaken by the private sector to build
concerns about corruption into existing investment funds that
emphasize social responsibility. Fourth, financial and technical
assistance to developing countries should increase funding to
programs that specifically seek to develop strategies and capacities
to deal with corruption.
Most directly and ambitiously, perhaps, the international community
should come together to negotiate an international treaty on anti-corruption
measures. After all, the international system is predicated on
states that are responsible to their citizens and to their fellow
states. Much effort is made to have these governments make promises
about issues like the environment and human rights. Yet, these
state promises count for little when the system is riddled by
corruption. Equality for citizens, rationality in deciding on
development priorities and the pre-eminence of public good over
private gain are just some of the ideals that get rubbished in
corrupt systems. Otherwise even the solemn promises made by the
state can be sold off for private gain.
Anti-corruption efforts must not be neglected by Asians and their
friends. They should instead be at the core of reform towards
good governance.
Simon
SC Tay is chairman of the Singapore Institute of International
Affairs, a non governmental think tank that is a founder member
of the network of ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International
Studies. He is concurrently a professor of international law at
the National University of Singapore and a non-elected and independent
Member of the Singapore Parliament, nominated by the public. Email:
siia@pacific.net.sg
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