Poverty eradication programmes in a context of negative growth and high debt:
The case of Jamaica, 1995-1999

Judith Wedderburn

Acknowledgements

The Association of Development Agencies wishes to acknowledge the sterling contribution of Mr. Berris Morrison, graduate of the University of the West Indies, in the preparation of this paper. After discussions with ADA about the main theme of the Conference, and the major issues which ADA wished to address with specific reference to Jamaica, Mr. Morrison, with support from ADA, marshalled the relevant data and provided the analyses and recommendations which form the main body of this paper.

1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND: Social policy in the Context of SAPs

The substantive topic ‘poverty eradication programmes in the context of negative growth and high debt’ if considered in a mathematical context, would most certainly return the value, cannot compute. In other words, if we apply the logic of math to such a scenario the answer should be that poverty eradication as an effort, unless aimed at only an insignificant incidence, would be very unlikely to succeed in an economic climate of negative growth and high debt servicing. Should our analysis presented in this paper therefore, conclude that Jamaica has reaped even fair success in its poverty eradication effort, then such an effort would be extremely commendable and worthy of emulation in other jurisdictions experiencing incidences of poverty ranging from mild to severe.

Though very much a legacy handed down to independent Jamaica in 1962, the problem of poverty as now experienced really came to prominence and attracted deliberate programmatic effort since the advent of the 1970s, when an external debt was already a feature of the socio-economic landscape. However, it was not until the transition into the 1980s and henceforth, had the debilitating consequences of poverty been appreciated for having the potential to seriously limit the achievement of development ideals comparable to that, which obtains in the Scandinavian countries, as an example.

The real challenges of development faced by Jamaica and several other Caribbean countries projected into the fore in the late 1970s, fortified throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s, have assumed seemingly impossible proportions at the commencement of the 2000s. The decade of the 1980s was a particularly telling period, with the emergence to world prominence of Thatcherism and Reaganomics, a partnership which represented an unbridled, and re-energized variety of the free market system avowing to quickly erase from contemporary memory, all semblance of the socialist challenge that had spread beyond the Soviet Bloc, and perceived to have found threatening favour in many developing countries of the South.

With the Reagan/Thatcher partnership providing a new legitimacy for the trickle down economic theory, social development within the economically dependent developing world was largely relegated to the status of being a consequence rather than a necessary condition for economic advancement. This made it easy for socially empty and economically strangling Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) to gain currency in that period, and to be rather skeptically embraced by vulnerable, some might say, shortsighted political leadership present in many developing countries at the time, Jamaica included.

Signing on to SAPs then, meant accepting a development modality whose theme was ‘let’s get the economics right and everything else will be taken care of’. Of course, getting the economics right came with a standard set of prescriptions. Included among these were requirements that domestic currencies go into immediate freefall, embarkation on a course of strong foreign borrowing with inexplicable conditionalities such as the facilitation of ‘free’ trade that flowed one way, north to south, and significant levels of social and public sector contraction.

The net and almost immediate result amounted to social fallout that occurred on a scale never before experienced in Jamaica and other participating states in the region. Unemployment for instance, climbed to unprecedented levels (percentages in the high 20s) and spawned new dimensions such as underemployment and the concept of the working poor. Interest rates and inflation also rose to unprecedented levels resulting in the overnight decimation of purchasing power for all but the wealthiest in society. Not unexpectedly, the national budget went into a rearrangement mode that saw debt servicing swelling rapidly at the expense of the social sector and capital investment expenditures. All of this was for getting the economics right, still very much an illusive target to Jamaica well over a decade later.

2. THE WSSD LINKAGE

With the perfect conditions ably created by the SAPs, poverty proceeded to take a viselike grip on the Jamaican society and on the region as a whole. Budgetary allocations to vital social portfolios such as education, health, housing and social welfare experienced massive cutbacks, as an increasingly greater share of the budget dollar became summoned in the service of newly acquired and growing multilateral debts. No government of the region and indeed, few in the developing world could afford to sidestep the rising poverty incidence that accompanied SAPs of the 80s and early 90s. Such was the condition at the time that exerted its share of motivating force towards the UN convening the World Summit for Social Development (WSSD) held in Copenhagen, Denmark in 1995. Jamaica and other territories of the region were natural willing participants.

The overwhelming significance of the WSSD was that for the first time in history the world’s nations had consciously united in convention to duly accord social development the kind of attention traditionally reserved for the economic agenda. The essence of the WSSD is aptly captured in this first point of the Copenhagen Declaration.

For the first time in history, at the invitation of the United Nations, we gather as heads of State and Government to recognize the significance of social development and human well being for all and to give to these goals the highest priority both now and into the twenty-first century [UN, 1995 :3].

The mandate was for signatories to the Convention to now face off squarely with issues such as poverty that had grown to the detriment of their respective nations. Jamaica and other Caribbean territories aside from signing, very quickly demonstrated their commitment by convening a social development summit of their own (CSSD) within a month after the WSSD. Arising out of the WSSD Jamaica concretized its own position with regards to poverty eradication, and set about formalizing strategy informed by an appropriate policy position. This gave rise to the national Policy on Poverty Eradication of 1995.

3. JAMAICA POVERTY STATUS OVERVIEW

Whatever the criticism that might be leveled at the effectiveness of the Jamaican anti-poverty effort, there are few countries in the world that have had, since 1989, a better or more consistent record of tracking the incidence of poverty. This has been achieved through the launch in 1989, of the Jamaica Survey of Living Conditions (JSLC) that has since been performed annually without a break.

Many would argue that this level of poverty monitoring in Jamaica, should be reflected in progressive inroads being made into the problem. Table 1 captures the recorded incidence of poverty in Jamaica since 1989, at both the level of the individual and household, and allows for a reader assessment of anti-poverty progress achieved over the period.

Table 1: National Incidence of Poverty: Jamaica 1989-1999

Source: Data obtained from Jamaica Survey of Living Conditions (JSLC)
Reports (1989-1999).

From Table 1 it can be seen that the incidence of poverty among households and individuals in Jamaica attained their highest levels between 1989 and 1996. However, based on the trend of the data, and considering that SAPs were introduced in the early 1980s, it is not unlikely that the unmeasured pre 1989 years would have had comparable, if not higher poverty levels.

The pattern of data in Table 1 also highlights noticeably lower levels of poverty post 1995 compared to the prior period. This is made clearer in Figure 1 where the dip in poverty levels as at 1995 is quite evident.

Based on these data, it is undeniable that much progress has been made coming from a peak in 1991 of 44.6% of the Jamaican population being classified as poor, to a situation in 1999 where the figure stood at 17%. An examination of the most recent period however, while showing that commendable progress continues to be achieved, also indicates that the problem still maintains significant challenges.

The 1999 poverty level indicates that 10.5% of the population who were poor in 1995 was no longer categorized as such five years later. However, gains made in 1998 when at 15.9%, the poverty level achieved its lowest point in a decade, were lost in 1999 when it climbed back up to 17.0%. The suggestion here is that the situation is not yet under fundamental control, and points to a possible resource problem that itself would have spawned a number of limiting situations to the overall poverty eradication effort.

4. ANTI-POVERTY PROGRAMMING AND THE NPEP

Though the assessed poverty levels leading up to 1995 never really had the benefit of any kind of coordinated national programmatic approach, the period had not simply passed without any kind of response aimed at addressing the problem. On the contrary, a range of measures was pursued which in retrospect, informs of both recognition of the diverse presentations of poverty and the need for a multifaceted approach to its treatment. What was largely absent then, and which might have caused a measure of underachievement in the overall poverty reduction drive, was the coordination of those efforts into an integrated programme designed to achieve more of a global impact through enhanced individual programme efficiencies. Essentially, it was the inclusion of this particular element in the post 1995 effort that substantially differentiated it from the treatment approach of the prior period, and as the poverty incidence figures indicate, some success was reaped from the change.

Table 2: Poverty Reduction Policy Framework: Jamaica - 1995

Source: Jamaica Policy Towards Poverty Eradication (Draft), Planning Institute of Jamaica, 1995.

This new approach was one informed by formal government policy on poverty eradication drafted in 1995 against a recognition of then high and growing incidence of poverty nationally, and taking due cognizance of commitments under the WSSD convention. The policy recognized the causes, nature and incidence of poverty, and proffered specific solutions sensitive to these diverse facets of the problem. In so doing it sought to single out four (4) broad target groups for action. Anti-poverty impact achieved in these groups it was projected, would result in substantial inroads made into the broader national poverty problem (see Table 2).

Charting of the policy framework not only took cognizance of the real incidence of poverty in Jamaica at the time, but also the range of diverse initiatives that were already in place, and gave due consideration to new approaches thought necessary to counter the problem. Thus evolved the National Poverty Eradication Programme (NPEP) coordinated through the Programme Coordinating and Monitoring Unit (PCMU) of the Office of the Prime Minister.

The complement of constituent anti-poverty programme initiatives in place as at the end of 1999 was not substantially different from what existed in the pre-1995 period. The fundamental difference was really the integrative role assigned to the PCMU with policy formalization. The NPEP comprises a diverse range of individual anti-poverty initiatives in the form of projects and administrative programmes that operate through selected government ministries, and involving a number of NGOs and CBOs. Among the included government agencies are the ministries of Agriculture, Education, Health, Industry & Investment, Labour & Social Security, Local Government, Housing, Water and Finance (see Appendix II for a full listing of programme initiatives and associated government ministries). Of course, members of the NGO fraternity were always involved through various programmes of their own and by the initiative of others, but these were mostly targeted at the community level.

Together, the complement of projects within the overall programme suggest a recognition of the need to focus on issues of education, health & nutrition, housing, income generation & employment, youth, welfare and social infrastructure in order to successfully confront the Jamaican poverty problem. Poverty reduction achieved at the level of both the household and individual since 1995 does indicate that some measure of success has been achieved (refer to Table 1 and Figure 1), but hardly tells the whole story.

5. EXAMINING THE PROGRESS ACHIEVED

The incidence of poverty data by themselves definitely do not reveal the full picture, as there are a number of critical related issues whose examination sheds further light on the quality of the poverty reduction achieved, particularly as regards the sustainability of apparent gains achieved. Indeed, the incidence of poverty for the years 1997-1999 does give credence to any questioning there might be, of the sustainability of the notable reductions achieved over the preceding period of several years. Among the critical but somewhat discreet issues that speaks to the level of entrenchment of poverty in Jamaica are the following:

1. A sizeable and widening consumption differential that separates the poorest and wealthiest groups within the population;
   
   
2. The extent to which any real gains have been achieved in critical social sector areas such as education and health;
   
   
3. The extent to which the macro economy is presenting a supportive framework for the national poverty eradication effort, social development in general, and;
   
   
4. Popular perception of the citizenry about the extent of poverty present in the country, and their level of optimism about conditions generally improving in the future.

A confirmed feature of poverty wherever deeply entrenched in the world is a high level of inequality that exists between different groups in terms of consumption levels, also a fair proxy of income levels. Haiti for instance, rated at #150 (year 2000) on the UNHDI (UN Human Development Index), is known to have one of the most skewed consumption/income distribution in the world. By UN standards that country is classified as a low-income country with a per capita GNP of US$760 or less as measured in 1998.

In the case of Jamaica, the country has over the past decade been attracting attention for having a level of inequality which is also quite substantial and continues to widen, albeit incrementally (see Figure 2). In the year 2000 Jamaica was located at #83 on the UNHDI and was classified as a medium income country with per capita GNP falling in the band US$760 at the low end to just over US$9000 at the high end.

In the past decade or so, whereas Haiti has been incrementally ascending the UNHDI Jamaica has been slipping. Between 1999 and 2000 for instance, Haiti advanced 2 places up and Jamaica dropped 1 place. Based on the UNHDI methodology, the reality of Jamaica’s growing income/consumption inequality is bound to have played an important part in its UNHDI decline. Against this background therefore, any proper assessment of the effectiveness of the country’s poverty eradication programme cannot reasonably expect to bypass scrutiny of the consumption gap that exists between the wealthiest and poorest groups in the society.

In 1990 the wealthiest 10% of the Jamaican population enjoyed a level of consumption that was 10 times as much as the poorest 10%. In 1994 the equivalent figure was 12 times as much (see Figure 2). Still, by 1999 the gap had widened even further to 12.3 times, notwithstanding the formalization and supposed strengthening of the National Poverty Eradication Programme in 1995, post WSSD.

If Jamaica had experienced a certain level of positive growth, one would expect that any substantive inroads made into Jamaica’s poverty problem would also have succeeded in reducing that level of inequality in some consistent pattern over the same period.

Source: Consumption data from JSLC 1999, PIOJ.

We do know however, that the Jamaican economy actually contracted in real terms over the period. This explains to some extent, why poverty reductions achieved, though commendable, cannot as yet be counted as sustainable, as economic growth remains illusive, and debt servicing a dangerous burden.

Jamaica’s declining economic fortunes, particularly since the mid 1990s, has been paralleled by social sector contraction, related to a shrunken economic resource base on the one hand and to issues of policy effectiveness and efficiency on the other. It is difficult for any social sector contraction not to be perceived somewhat in terms of a savaging of critical areas such as education and health in favour of apparently ‘more pressing’ economic imperatives like debt servicing and the government administrative bureaucracy. What for instance have been the fortunes of education in such a computation, and how, if at all, might this have manifested itself?

In this context, what has been the fortune of the education component of Jamaica’s Poverty Eradication Programme? We chose education because it has been proven the world over to represent the most fundamental force of poverty eradication because of its empowerment potential for the individual to effectively confront the other issues of poverty by which he/she can be affected. It is common knowledge for instance, that the likelihood of educated parents avoiding health problems for their children, is much more probable than it is for uneducated parents. Similarly, the educated parents will have a greater appreciation for the value of education in and of itself, and so ensure that their children’s education is not compromised, much more so than the uneducated parents. This is not knowledge absent from Jamaica, and so any aspect of the approach to treat with education should be informed by these fundamentals.

If the most basic consideration behind the operation of an effective education system is to support development and ensure the progress of a nation, then its first objective must be to make the population literate, at least, functionally literate. With functional illiteracy now so pervasive in the country, to the extent that there is an outcry for a reinstatement of the JAMAL-led adult literacy effort of the 1970s, it is clear that the education system has failed in its most fundamental responsibility.

Government and political sympathizers are expectedly, inclined to be of a different view, and would readily point to other indicators that reflect more positively on the system. One such that has been widely heralded is age group enrolment at the different school levels in the system.

If we are talking about functional literacy and the avoidance of poverty, then the group of focus must overwhelmingly be the primary cohort, that is, those children aged 6-14 years. It is people who finish their education at this level who make up the majority of the country’s work force, and constitutes the largest band of citizens in the country (see Table 3).

Table 3: Percentage Enrolment in Schools by Age Group: Jamaica 1990-1999

Source: JSLC 1999, PIOJ/STATIN

School enrolment figures presented in Table 3 are particularly impressive for the primary (6-11 and 12-14) cohorts, ranging from 96.5% to 99.5% between 1990 and 1999. However, if attendance instead of enrolment among the different consumption groups, the figures are not impressive. An analysis by welfare status reveals that "money problems" was the major factor preventing the poorest households from sending their children to school. Thirty one (31%) percent in quintile 1 (the poorest) and twenty (20) percent in quintile 2 (the next poorest) were unable to attend school for this reason.

The education component of Jamaica’s poverty eradication programme could normally be counted as a huge success, if in fact the attainment of a high rate of enrolment in educational institutions, particularly at the primary level was matched by commensurate attendance. That is of course, assuming that other factors such as the quality of teachers and the overall school environment is at an acceptable level. Indications are that this is not so. Still, if those conditions were in place and primary attendance levels matched enrolment, it is perceivable that the greatest success would have been achieved where it is needed most, that is in the primary cohort already with an excellent level of enrolment.

The reality of the situation however, is that enrolment of a child in school is really of no currency to the provision of education if this is not accompanied by attendance, as it is the latter that facilitates learning (literacy and numeracy) and not the former, by itself.

Beyond the fundamental issue of education, not unexpectedly, popular opinion in Jamaica has for some time been of the view that the social sector is under much pressure. Jamaicans generally refer to their belief that poverty and unemployment are high and entrenched, and that the education and health systems are inadequate. Stone Polls regularly published in the Jamaica Observer daily newspaper over the past five years or so, has consistently confirmed public opinion on these issues.

Not denying that the situation could have been worse, especially considering the question of resource limitation, the facts are that 17% of the population lives in poverty, 16% are unemployed, there are more functionally illiterates exiting the primary school system now than ever before. In addition, both real and proportional budgetary allocations to the social sector has been on a downward spiral for several years running.

The Jamaican government in its fight against poverty has acknowledged resource limitation as a fundamental obstacle. Outside of government the views are divided as to whether the major obstacle has not been flawed policies as against resource limitation. Admittedly, it is unlikely that government policies would not contain imperfections. The truth however, is that no one can dispel the profound influence of resource limitation as a significant factor limiting the national poverty eradication effort in particular, and social development in general.

6. THE NEGATIVE GROWTH/ HIGH DEBT FACTOR

Few critics both within and outside of Jamaica have not sought to connect the country’s poverty with its r poor economic performance of nearly two decades running. At the same time, it is no longer debatable that the country’s participation in multilateral SAPs has played a significant part in this, as has been the case for several other regional territories. Whatever the original objectives of SAPs, the programmes succeeded in exposing a number of Caribbean countries to unprecedented retarded levels of economic performance in their post independent experience. Notwithstanding, since the advent of the SAPs, Guyana, arguably more devastated by such programmes than Jamaica, has managed to return to experiencing notable economic growth even as the Jamaican economy stagnated, and has actually been contracting in real terms in recent years (see Table 4).

Indeed, it was over 4 years ago in 1995 that Jamaica’s GDP last experienced a positive movement, and even then, this was a mere 0.7 of a percentage point growth. Since then, the economy has experienced an average annual contraction of approximately 1.05%. When the national debt burden is factored into the picture the gravity of the situation becomes even more profound.

As the economy experienced inertia the level of debt ballooned into devastating proportions. Whatever might have been said of government policy over the years, the national debt kept increasing. . The character of the debt underwent a transformation whereby the domestic proportion gained considerably on the foreign component during the last 5 years, resulting in a higher level of overall debt servicing..

Table 4: Jamaican Economic Growth Performance and Debt Servicing, 1995-1999

Source: Data extracted from Economic and Social Survey of Jamaica 1999; PIOJ.

A contracting GDP alongside burgeoning debt servicing responsibility anywhere, presents a perfect recipe for a compromise of the social development agenda. This scenario has been in classical manifestation in Jamaica throughout the late 1980s and into the 1990s, and has become particularly pronounced over the last five years (see Figure 3).

In theory, the fundamental effect of such a scenario is likely to be social fallout demonstrated by consistently high poverty levels and unemployment, a reduced quality and reach of the education and health services, problems with the provision of housing and state run utilities, and a reduced ability to both maintain and invest in critical physical infrastructure. This then fuels momentum of the proverbial vicious circle that strangles growth and development whilst entrenching a state of social malaise.

Before even looking on the ground for physical evidence of these manifestations, one would normally expect to see their reflection in the national budget via a crowding out of critical social agenda items by the debt-servicing requirement. Again, there is a classical representation of this in the Jamaican experience where between 1995 and 1999 budgetary expenditure on debt servicing as a percentage of GDP moved from being approximately twice to four times the expenditure on social and community services (refer to table 5 and Figure 4).

Table 5: Selected Social Sector Expenditures as Percentages of GDP
Jamaica 1995-1999

Source: Percentages calculated based on data supplied in Economic and Social Survey of Jamaica 1999, PIOJ.

Expectedly, as also demonstrated in Table 5, the trend is repeated for the main individual social agenda items such as education and health.

Interestingly, also evident from Table 5 is that within the scenario of a declining expenditure on social services, there is a trend of increasing allocation being made to the education sub-sector. This suggests a recognition by the government of the fundamental importance of education in counteracting poverty and general social malaise. This to some extent demonstrates a willingness of the heart and weakness of the flesh scenario. In the present Jamaican context the ‘weak flesh’ is a consequence of prolonged negative growth and high debt that has come to marginalize resources needed to turn back poverty and support social development generally. In this scenario, there is clearly an increasing role for debt forgiveness in filling the resource gap, where some capacity for the coordinated delivery of poverty eradication programmes has been displayed.

7. NPEP REVIEW

The WSSD convention when it came together in 1995, though highlighting specific themes, had broadly recognized the need for focus to be directed on the human social condition both at the world and individual country levels. Poverty had come in for emphatic treatment throughout the deliberations and as a theme, permeated the eventual declaration.

Once poverty visits upon a people, it carries with it the uncanny ability to assume roles of both cause and effect for almost every imaginable form of degeneration of the human condition and within the context of a destructive cycle. Indeed, only in situations where relatively small pockets of poverty exists in a society, combined with a fairly good supply of resources, is it likely that any poverty eradication effort has a chance of succeeding, unless this effort is informed by the knowledge and appreciation of this dual characteristic of the condition of poverty. Even so, that chance of success might very well be limited only to a containment of the pockets of poverty as against their elimination.

The diverse nature of the Jamaican pre 1995 anti-poverty response is therefore, indicative of an appreciation of the pervasive nature of the problem insofar as it had become manifest in differing circumstances that required a multifaceted approach to treat with the overall situation (refer to Table 2 and Appendix II). Beyond an examination of the adequacy of resources devoted to the poverty eradication effort, what was obviously absent then was an integration of all efforts into a coordinated programme. What is it that has really been achieved with the installment of this feature?

The NPEP has coordinated Jamaica’s poverty eradication effort since 1995. Its data gathering mechanism for programme monitoring is not yet as functional as it might be, a situation which speaks to some of the specific challenges faced by the PCMU as the coordinating unit. The NPEP quite expectedly, places some reliance on the institutionalized JSLC to provide indicative data on the global situation for Jamaica. For example, incidence of poverty, status of the public health and education services, and on substantial national social programmes such as the Food Stamp programme normally attract specific commentaries in the annual JSLC report.

The PCMU does however, makes an effort to provide periodic updates on the set of specific NPEP projects included in its coordinative portfolio. Challenges associated with the flow of individual project information to the PCMU limit the frequency, extent and comprehensiveness of the updates that are provided. Notwithstanding, in a recent update (mid 2000) put out by PCMU it notes several pluses and minuses of the programme.

Highlights:

• As at March 31, 2000 a total of J$19.944B had been expended through some 45 anti-poverty projects administered through 11 government ministries. This included several additions to the complement of pre 1995 uncoordinated initiatives
  
  
• Included among the new additions were the Prime Minister’s Indigent Housing Project (housing) and the Lift Up Jamaica Project aimed at providing employment for the youth.
  
  
• The NPEP now actively makes use of the JSLC findings for the purpose of improving its targeting of different categories of the poor;
  
  
• The NPEP now has in place a system of data gathering from the various projects as part of its monitoring and evaluation of the overall and individual programmes. As a result it has since been able to perform reviews of several programmes and made recommendations for adjustments towards their greater efficiency and effectiveness;
  
  
• NPEP brought together in 1998 project leaders, implementers and other categories of stakeholders for a national mid-term assessment of the programme.

The NPEP at the end of the 1999/2000 fiscal year singled out several projects as being most noteworthy. These are listed in Appendix II with information on aspects of their to-date cost and impact where available. In terms of large-scale impact, among the best performing project initiatives included in the NPEP list of projects are the Jamaica Social Investment Fund (Min. of Finance) and micro enterprise initiatives that comes under the Industry and Investment portfolio ministry. These include the GOJ/GON Micro Enterprise Project (MEP), GOJ/EU Project, Micro Investment Development Agency (MIDA) and the Self-Start Fund (SSF).

Both sets of projects have several key features in common. They have relatively sizeable allocation of financial resources, national reach and they work through and involve a number of existing institutions that are mostly non-governmental. In the case of JSIF, which supports the development of infrastructure in poor communities, it is on record as having approved some 214 of 1062 community project applications received, and that some 280,000 Jamaicans have benefited directly from 54 completed and 160 work-in-process projects as of mid 1999.

Regarding the Micro Enterprise initiatives, the most successful project has been the GOJ/GON MEP, with both MIDA and SSF being actual institutional agencies of the Industry and Investment Ministry. The GOJ/GON MEP which closed on Phase II at the end of April 1999, had facilitated loans worth over J$250M which supported nearly 2000 new and existing enterprises, and generated employment for approximately 6000 persons between 1994 and 1999. The programme however had its major funding from a Dutch grant, and whereas the funds have been retained in the sector in support of other micro credit initiatives, the Dutch has since indicated a strategic shift in the targeting of their substantive development aid focus to UNHDI low income ranked countries such as Haiti.

Constraints:

• There is recognition by the NPEP of the inadequacy of financial resources required to support the programme.
  
  
• The PCMU now recognizes the need to have a broader operating mandate to increase its effectiveness at coordinating the NPEP.
  
  
• Universal cooperation born out of a full appreciation by Ministry and Agency implementing personnel for the role of the individual projects listed under the NPEP is yet to be fully secured. This has made the task of the PCMU more difficult than it should.
  
  
• The non-standard generation and maintenance of project data associated with the individual programme initiatives makes it difficult to carry out the impact monitoring function.
  
  
• As a result of a lagging Local Government Reform Programme (LGRP), the NPEP has been unable to benefit from projected implementation support it was scheduled to have obtained from local government. This has helped to compromise the level of effectiveness it has been able to achieve.

Whereas the above-listed NPEP programme constraints were not the result of any comprehensive overview of the Programme they are however, sufficiently insightful to reflect two fundamental but not unexpected concerns. The first is the already exposed resource limitation issue, while the second has a bearing on another programme of government that has been in implementation for sometime now, the Administrative Reform Project (ARP). Since much has already been said about the former, a brief commentary will made about the latter.

However unlikely the prospect might seem, the government administrative bureaucracy will have to, at some time, begin functioning as a unit with common objectives. The territorialism of portfolios and departments is not a facilitative structure for any national programme of great imperative such as the NPEP. In the same breadth, it is to be noted that the administration of government garners a significant share of the national budget for itself.

8. REQUIREMENTS FOR BEST ANTI-POVERTY RESULTS

The best results are poverty reductions that are sustainable. In the present circumstances poverty it seems, is likely to be with Jamaica, and at worrying levels, for some time to come. If that does not represent a desirable state of affairs to be in, as Jamaicans have already determined, then the nation as a whole and government in particular, has a responsibility to rid us of this scourge. If poverty represents anti-prosperity as Jamaicans have generally determined it to be, then we should move quickly to rid the nation of it.

(i). Reorder National Priorities and Reflect this in the Budget:

The Jamaican reality speaks to a necessary reordering of the national priorities as a first step towards a prosperous and poverty-free nation. Indeed, if this reordering was not necessary, then the logic suggests that we would not be poor. The mathematics of the national budget now ranks debt servicing as being nearly four times as important as the social sector, and nearly six times as important as education in particular.

The reordering of our priorities need to see the social sector made more important than debt servicing, and education made at least, equally important. The decision to effect these changes will pose the greatest difficulty only if authority is not sold on the idea that the priorities as they are now, are misplaced and will perpetuate poverty so long as resources remain limited. The argument that we are borrowing to make the economy grow is now effectively dead, as we have borrowed heavily for over twenty years, and the result is a shrunken economy and diminishing national resources.

(ii). Support National Programmes that Bear Results:

Programmes such as JSIF and GOJ/GONMEP have turned up good results. Replicate and/or expand them. If we are sold on the results they bring, we should not wait for grants and handouts to fund them, as national revenue put into these programmes will be money well spent.

(iii). Involve NGOs, CBOs and Private Organizations More in Social and Economic Projects:

If these organizations are part of the formula that makes things work well, then they should be included in everything. Where resources are scarce, it would be unwise to continue to expend them through government agencies that show the least results for effort. Also, NGOs and CBOs provide vital project legitimacy at the community/beneficiary level, a condition usually less associated with government run schemes.

(iv). Better Governance Structures

There is an urgent need for better and more transparent governance structures, within and between government institutions, the NGO sector, the labour movement and the private sector that will promote a consensus-building approach as the necessary re-ordering of resources and priorities takes place. In this regard, external support in the form of debt relief, bilateral and multilateral will be a vital additional component for the successful implementation of a sustainable social development agenda.

(v). Continue to Reform the Government Machinery to Make it More Efficient:

The government’s Administrative Reform Programme is one of the most commendable and should be continued and completed in the shortest possible time, making sure of course, that the process of conversion is objective, professional and non-discriminatory. A NPEP for instance, would have far fewer challenges to deal with, and would have achieved more to date if it were operating in the context of an executive agency, and also, were interfacing with more of other such agencies than with government departments. It is all about efficiency, effectiveness and responsibility. Sadly, but not surprisingly, these are qualities that largely do not reside within the corridors of the government bureaucracy. Poverty eradication would be better served by these changes.

(v). Get the Economics Right Just Once:

Why do we borrow funds if not to improve our situation, economic or otherwise? Improvements have been made, but have they been worth the social fallout? Jamaica has been borrowing heavily over the last twenty years. In this paper we have highlighted the social fallout and economic decline, and a balance sheet that looks worse today than when we started borrowing. Will someone please show the improvements the country has made through borrowing? In identifying the improvements, we must keep in mind that improvement is as much about a people as it is about physical infrastructure.

It is human intelligence, technology and resources that usually combine to generate wealth. Also, it is mostly human intelligence that allows individuals and families to avoid issues like poverty, even in situations that encourages poverty. If we marginalize education it means we are not ever going to be wealthy and we are always going to be poor, unless of course we are investing in luck. A person with no dependents can choose to operate on that basis and pay the ultimate price, but for a household or a country it is a bit different, as the price required will always be too high. Education should be focused on preparing young Jamaicans for the demands of the emerging labour markets at both national and global levels.

9. CONCLUDING REMARKS

While Jamaica has made some progress in reducing the incidence of poverty since the WSSD of 1995, the gains do not appear to be sustainable, and the future certainly does not appear as bright as it might have been for the country’s overall social development agenda. Hope however, resides in the knowledge that better options are yet to be tried.

One of these options must be the reordering of national priorities in favour of the social agenda. Commonsense would suggest that the much-pursued, but ever elusive economic goals that consume the lion’s share of our limited and indeed, shrinking resource base, are more likely to be achieved in the long run as a result of the focus shift. After all, is it not educated, intelligent, healthy and productive human beings that make economies work?

WSSD’s central appeal was for an elevation of the social development agenda from its longstanding subservient position to the economic agenda. After a worsening scenario five years hence, surely it must be in Jamaica’s interest to now heed the call, a call of which it was very much a part at Copenhagen in 1995.

REFERENCES

1. Business Research and Agricultural Consultants. GOJ/GON Micro Enterprise Project: TLF Impact Evaluation (Final Report). Ministry of Industry and Investment, Kingston, Jamaica. 1999.
2. Deslandes, Derrick D. (for Government of Jamaica) National Eradication Programme: A community-Based Partnership Approach. Kingston Jamaica. 1995.
3. Francis, A A. The Dynamics of Debt in The Jamaican Economy. Department of Economics, UWI and Association of Development Agencies (ADA). 2000.
4. Government of Jamaica. Jamaica’s Policy Towards Poverty Eradication and National Poverty Eradication Programme. (Ministry Paper #13). Kingston Jamaica. 1997.
5. Management Options Limited. GOJ/GON Micro Enterprise Project Impact Evaluation of The Small Loan Fund. Ministry of Industry and Investment, Kingston, Jamaica. 1999.
6. Morrison, Berris L. The Feasibility of Establishing a System of Social Indicators in The Commonwealth Caribbean. (A Masters Thesis). Consortium Graduate School, UWI, Mona. 1996.
7. Patterson, P. J. (Prime Minister of Jamaica). National Poverty Eradication Programme (NPEP) – An Update. (Ministry Paper) PCMU, OPM, Kingston, Jamaica. 2000.
8. PCMU. Brief on National Poverty Eradication Programme (NPEP). PCMU, OPM, Kingston, Jamaica. 2000.
9. PIOJ & STATIN. Jamaica Survey of Living Conditions 1994. Kingston, Jamaica. 1994.
10. PIOJ & STATIN. Jamaica Survey of Living Conditions 1995. Kingston, Jamaica. 1995.
11. PIOJ & STATIN. Jamaica Survey of Living Conditions 1997. Kingston, Jamaica. 1997.
12. PIOJ & STATIN. Jamaica Survey of Living Conditions 1999. Kingston, Jamaica. 1999.
13. PIOJ. Economic and Social Survey of Jamaica 1999. Kingston, Jamaica. 1999.
14. PIOJ. Jamaica’s Policy Towards Poverty Eradication. Kingston, Jamaica. 1995.
15. UNDP. Human development Report 1999. New York: Oxford University Press. 1999.
16. UNDP. Human development Report 2000. New York: Oxford University Press. 2000.
17. United Nations. Report of The World Summit For Social Development. (General A/Conf.166/9). April 1995.
18. Wedderburn, J and B. Levy. Globalization and Governance (A Study Prepared for UN-ECLAC). 1999.

APPENDIX I

NATIONAL POVERTY ERADICATION PROGRAMME (NPEP):
Selected Projects and Their Impact.

Source: Data extracted from ‘Brief on NPEP’, PCMU, 2000.

APPENDIX II
National poverty eradication programme (NPEP) projects