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The
Copenhagen Summit: Policies
CSO priorities
During the preparation process, the policy
positions of the three principal CSO groupings became increasingly convergent.
This did not require any significant abandonment or modification of policies
as there had never been major conflicts between them. Moreover, it was
more a matter of gradually adding items from each others submissions
than of a concerted effort to achieve uniformity. Although some governments
and CSOs demanded a single CSO position, the principal groupings believed
that the convergence and complementarity of their views made pursuit of
complete uniformity unnecessary and indeed likely to cause undesirable
delay, tension and dilution of their views through negotiating a comprehensive
consensus document.
There
were some differences, however, in the priorities which the principal
groupings emphasised. The Womens Caucus concentrated mainly on questions
of gender equity and empowerment, especially in relation to education,
reproductive health, employment, personal security and access to political
and corporate power. During the course of Summit preparations, it gave
increasing attention to aspects of macro-economic policy which were being
raised by some other CSOs. It also developed more detailed proposals in
relation to the informal sector of the labour market, anti-discrimination
laws, and the operation of the United Nations system on social issues.
The
Development Caucus focused especially on increasing the level of official
development assistance (ODA) and achieving broader, deeper and faster
debt relief. It also supported adoption of the so-called 20/20 principle
to achieve greater allocation of donor and recipient funds for basic social
needs. It strongly criticised the basic policies and practices of the
World Bank and International Monetary Fund, especially through structural
adjustment programmes and conditionalities, as being harmful to many people
in developing countries. Over time, it also gave increasing emphasis to
aspects of taxation, human rights and the conduct of transnational corporations.
The
priorities of the International Council on Social Welfare related to achieving
political, economic and legal environments, especially at the international
level, which promote social development. For example, ICSW called for
tighter regulation of the international financial system and for international
cooperation in development of progressive tax systems which raise sufficient
revenue for social investment. It also called for strengthening the UNs
role on economic and social policy, especially through the Economic and
Social Council, and improving implementation of the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Target dates for achieving specific
anti-poverty outcomes became of increasing importance in its advocacy
during the latter stage of negotiations.
Many CSOs in the social welfare and social
development sectors focused on a particular area such as health, education
or housing or on a particular group of people such as older people, refugees
or people with disabilities. The breadth of the Summit agenda, however,
meant that there was little prospect of any such issues being the subject
of detailed, well-informed and sustained negotiation. Some CSOs from other
sectors contributed to the preparatory process without most of them becoming
involved intensively or at length. This applies, for example, to CSOs
in the environmental, consumer and human rights fields.
A
substantial proportion of the CSOs expressed their concerns and views
at a very general level. For example, they emphasised the gravity of problems
such as poverty and unemployment and they
proposed general directions for addressing them such as people-centred
development, more participation for civil society and more resources for
poor people and developing countries. Unlike the principal groupings,
especially ICSW and the Womens Caucus, most CSOs did not propose
detailed textual amendments to the draft agreements.
The Summit
agreements
The
Copenhagen agreements run to more than 100 pages and cover a vast array
of topics. While most governments and CSOs seemed unworried by this prolixity,
a few fought hard but unsuccessfully for a much briefer and more specific
document. Throughout the negotiation process, most governments and CSOs
concentrated on questions of rhetoric and general philosophy rather than
specific questions of practical implementation. This applies especially
to the almost complete lack of attention to the final two draft commitments
which related to resources, structures and processes for achieving the
lofty goals described in the earlier commitments. One cause of this neglect
was that each round of negotiations began at the first commitment and
ran very short of time before reaching the later commitments.
Pressure
from CSOs contributed to a number of significant improvements in the draft
agreements. They include addition of the commitment dealing principally
with health and education, greater emphasis on gender equity, recognition
of the importance of civil society, and a focus on the rights of indigenous
people. The passages relating to the international financial system, taxation
and regulation of business conduct arose solely from initiatives by a
handful of CSOs. A few CSOs were also crucial to achieving the emphasis
on economic, social and cultural rights despite strong opposition from
some governments.
Lobbying
by one or two CSOs also contributed substantially to the passages on strengthening
the Economic and Social Council and on regular regional reviews of implementation
of the Summit agreements. While the passages in the agreements on official
development assistance, the 20/20 principle, debt relief and structural
adjustment were ultimately very limited, they would have been even weaker
without strong CSO pressure. The same is true of the limited success in
obtaining agreement on specific anti-poverty target dates and references
to the importance of full employment, small and medium enterprises, and
microcredit.
A
striking feature of the Summit itself in Copenhagen was that many speeches
by heads of government displayed a livelier awareness of the gravity of
social problems, and of the need for substantial adjustment of economic
and other policies, than had been evident in their representatives
contributions during the earlier negotiations. This partly reflected the
dominance of finance ministry policies in the views which were expressed
by many of those representatives. Very few of the senior representatives
were experts in social policy rather than in economics or foreign affairs
and most were bureaucrats rather than elected politicians.
During
the negotiations, most CSOs were deeply disappointed with progress. At
the end, however, there was a much more positive response from many of
those who had been closely involved. Both the earlier negativity and the
subsequent enthusiasm were somewhat excessive. The final document was
stronger on rhetoric than action and, while many passages were welcome
to most CSOs, other passages endorsed economic policies which were much
less acceptable. Indeed, almost any point of view could find support somewhere
in the voluminous agreement.
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