CSOs and Intergovernmental Organisations


Aspects of interaction

     The balance between different kinds of CSOs has been affected substantially during the last decade by the United Nations’ relaxation of its rules and practices in relation to accreditation of CSOs. A large number of national and local CSOs have, in practice, acquired similar rights in the Copenhagen process and other UN meetings to those previously afforded principally to formally structured and long-established international CSOs. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, ad hoc “caucuses” without formal and transparent structures, and representing relatively few substantial organisations, have sometimes been regarded as meriting greater access than global CSOs each representing thousands or even tens of thousands of organisations across the world.

     This new approach has been justified by some people as improving access for CSOs from developing countries. Certainly, many of the longer-established global CSOs have signally failed to live up to their claims and responsibilities in that regard, although there are signs of improvement in some quarters. On the other hand, the extent to which the approach benefits CSOs from developing countries is often over-stated. While key UN personnel and processes continue to be located so overwhelmingly in New York and Geneva, North American and European CSOs will continue to have huge advantages. Indeed, these advantages have been increased to some extent by the new approach, since so many of the newer CSO representatives in attendance at the UN on a regular basis are from nearby, industrialised countries. In these circumstances, many “northern” CSOs can and do acquire a disproportionate influence.

     It may be somewhat paradoxical that some of the strongest advocates of the new, relatively “all-in” approach to UN accreditation are also frequent advocates of developing a single joint statement for all CSOs at a particular meeting. On some occasions such a statement may be feasible and desirable. On others, however, it may cause so much delay, tension, equivocation or prolixity that the ultimate statement is largely ineffectual and energies are diverted from more fruitful strategies. Moreover, the impact of a single joint CSO statement can be overstated by comparison with a number of convergent statements which have differing but complementary priorities and are expressed from a variety of backgrounds.

     Some people go further by urging development of an over-arching representative organisation for the whole of civil society. This may be appropriate and practical in relation to an organisation with the role of promoting political, legal, financial and other conditions which enable a strong civil society to develop. But very different considerations apply in relation to representation on issues of substantive policy, where development of a single representative organisation could detract severely from the very essence and strength of civil society, namely its diversity of interests, perspectives and circumstances. The policy statements of a sole representative organisation for the whole of civil society might often have to be either too unrepresentative to retain credibility or too unfocused and equivocal to be effective.

“Constructive regionalism”

     There is much to be said for promoting a concept of international governance which might be called “constructive regionalism”. It would be “constructive” in the sense of encouraging regions to be positive in their engagement with other parts of the world rather than merely defensive and exclusive. It would also be constructive in the sense of developing strong regional structures which help to construct a global framework for cooperation that more adequately reflects the interests of all countries and people, rather than mainly of the richest, and that strikes an appropriate balance between global uniformity and localised autonomy. By these and other means, constructive regionalism can help to maximise the benefits of internationalisation in economic and other fields and to minimise the dangers.

     It is certainly important for governments and civil society to interact much more closely at the regional level. This applies not only to large, continentally defined regions but also to smaller, neighbourly groupings which more adequately reflect similarities in circumstances, cultures and interests. Examples include the regions of the European Union, Association of South East Asian Nations, Mercosur, Southern African Development Community and other such intergovernmental groupings which have become more common and influential in recent years. The UN’s effectiveness could improve substantially if these groupings were more closely involved in its work and, for example, formed the principal basis of blocs for election and negotiation within ECOSOC. This would help to ensure that the growing incidence of “bi-regional” and sometimes “multi-regional” interaction develops within an appropriate global framework.

     CSOs within the European Union have increasingly combined into regional organisations in recent years in order to engage more effectively with the EU. A similar approach in other regions would require CSOs to urge the relevant intergovernmental groupings to give greater attention to social issues and perspectives and to become much more open to active engagement with CSOs. This approach was strongly supported at the ICSW series of regional forums on Copenhagen implementation. A further step, which could be of great benefit to developing countries in their efforts to negotiate effectively at the global level, would be to develop much closer interaction between the regional groupings of the “south”. This approach was proposed in the Bali Declaration and Plan of Action that was adopted in 1998 by the Group of 77.

ECOSOC and the General Assembly

     A crucial issue for CSOs with international interests is to assess whether ECOSOC should be urged and assisted to play the overarching role on international economic and social policy that is provided for it in the UN Charter. The need for some organisation to play this role has been emphasised recently by the debates about interaction between trade rules of the WTO, labour standards of the ILO, multilateral environmental agreements, and human rights treaties. It also arises in relation to the reference to ECOSOC of the proposal that the World Bank, IMF and others should ensure that their interventions in countries are consistent with an internationally agreed set of standards for social policy.

     Very few CSOs take an active interest in ECOSOC, apparently having come to the understandable but perhaps short-sighted conclusion that it is too ineffective to merit their attention. There may, however, be considerable scope for improving its performance, especially if its operative meetings are more frequent and make greater use of small sub-groups to achieve greater vigour, expertise and momentum. If this approach is rejected or fails, it will be essential to pursue some other approach for developing a body which is sufficiently broadly-based to balance the interests, for example, of developed and developing countries, of economic, social and environmental concerns, and of governments and civil society.

     One response to frustration with ECOSOC, and the UN generally, has been to urge establishment of some kind of People’s Assembly as an advisory or even co-determinative addition to the General Assembly. This may have some merit but it is not clear whether such a body could be convened in a sufficiently representative way to justify a co-determinative role, except perhaps with very limited powers. It would be very dangerous to pursue strategies for UN reform which, albeit unwittingly, might reduce the pressure and incentive for governments to be popularly elected and to represent all their people at the international level.

     On the other hand, there is much to be said for enabling greater CSO interaction with the General Assembly, not only through an appropriate accreditation system for attending meetings but especially through inviting CSO leaders to serve on expert committees and panels and through improving timely access to key documents under negotiation. The Security Council has taken some interesting moves in some of these directions in recent times. There is also much to be said for developing a closer interaction between the UN and cross-party parliamentary committees or other structures which include a fuller range of popularly elected representatives rather than only those of the governing party.

Conclusion

     CSOs can make a major contribution to development of better structures and processes for international governance. In order to do so, they will need to get their own houses in somewhat better order and to concentrate on practicalities and details in their proposals and strategies rather than principally on rhetoric and symbolism. Many of the most important opportunities lie at the regional level, especially if seen also as part of a global framework. A number of useful directions for action were included in the Copenhagen agreements, although they did not receive much attention from governments and CSOs at the time. They should now be made a high priority in the process for implementation of those agreements, including the Special Session of the UN General Assembly in Geneva next June.